wif.tax

Aembit

B Aembit Workload IAM (Aembit Cloud API and Edge)

The Aembit management API takes no long-lived keys: workloads trade an OIDC ID token from any issuer they configure, or a cloud or CI identity, for a short-lived Aembit access token. Into AWS, GCP and Azure it is keyless, but for Okta, GitHub, Slack, Google Workspace and Salesforce you still paste an API token or your own OAuth app's client secret into Aembit.

Docs: docs.aembit.io · Checked 2026-10-13 · source YAML · dispute via PR

Inbound A

How a workload running anywhere authenticates to this product.

A Trust Provider (OIDC ID Token for any issuer, plus GitHub, GitLab, Terraform Cloud, AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and Kerberos types) attests the workload and matches iss, aud, sub and custom claims; an Aembit Access Token Credential Provider bound to an Aembit Role then issues a short-lived bearer token for the Cloud API.

Issuers
any

Machine access to the management API has no static-key path at all: the only other documented method is a human's browser-session token copied from the UI profile. The Terraform provider takes only a Trust Provider "client_id" (an identifier, not a secret) plus the platform's ID token. The OIDC ID Token Trust Provider can validate signatures by OIDC discovery, uploaded JWKS, an uploaded public key, or a Base64 shared symmetric key; the last is an optional customer-held secret for legacy issuers, not an Aembit credential. Edge components: Agent Controller registers by Trust Provider attestation (AWS Role, AWS or Azure metadata, Kubernetes service account) or, on-prem and bare metal, with a 15-minute one-time Device Code; after registration it holds a refresh token it uses to mint access tokens, and Agent Proxies get their Aembit Cloud token from the Agent Controller. That stored refresh token is the one persistent credential in the Edge path and its lifetime is not documented publicly.

Outbound B

How this product reaches into your cloud, repos, or other SaaS.

Aembit acts as an OIDC issuer that your AWS (STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity), GCP (Workload Identity Federation with service account impersonation) and Azure (Entra federated credential) trust, so cloud access is keyless; most SaaS targets (Okta, GitHub, Slack, Google Workspace, Salesforce, Wiz) instead need an API token or a client secret from an OAuth app you register, stored in Aembit.

Aembit's outbound surface is its Credential Providers: what Aembit Cloud (or the Agent Proxy, with Private Network Access) uses to reach the target on the workload's behalf. Checked: AWS (STS federation, keyless; Secrets Manager via an IAM Role integration), GCP (WIF, keyless; BigQuery also offers a client-secret OAuth path), Azure / Microsoft Graph (Entra WIF, keyless; the Microsoft Graph server guide and the Office 365 / Microsoft Enterprise MCP gateway pages instead use a client secret you create), Azure Key Vault (keyless via Entra federation), Vault (Aembit-signed JWT, keyless), Claude and OpenAI APIs (WIF credential providers, keyless), Snowflake (Aembit-generated key pair, only the public key leaves Aembit), S3 and GCS log streams (bucket policy and WIF, keyless). Want a static secret from you: Okta (SSWS API token, the only documented method), GitHub (PAT, or client secret of a GitHub App or OAuth app you register; no Aembit-owned GitHub App), Slack, Google Workspace / Drive and Salesforce (client secret of an app you register, plus a user authorization), Microsoft Graph via client credentials, Wiz discovery (client ID and secret), GitLab service-account integration (a PAT that Aembit then rotates). The generic API Key and Username & Password providers exist for targets with nothing better and hold whatever you paste (their docs describe no rotation), and the Azure Key Vault provider states it "Doesn’t manage secret lifecycle (creation, rotation, deletion)—only retrieval." Because the clouds are keyless and the SaaS connectors are not, this is a B; the static secrets are for third-party targets that offer no federation, which is the problem Aembit exists to contain, but the rubric counts them.

Hygiene for any static credential the product still issues

· Expiry enforceableNot applicable: no static credential on the graded path.
Aembit issues no long-lived machine credential for its own API: access tokens carry a configured lifetime and are minted from attested identity.
  • docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
    “Aembit requires you to use Authorization Header Bearer (access) tokens when making API calls and doesn’t support long-lived credentials.”
  • docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
    “Lifetime - The duration for which the generated access token remains valid. The minimum lifetime is 300 seconds (5 minutes).”
· Rotation via APINot applicable: no static credential on the graded path.
No static Aembit key exists to rotate.
  • docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
    “Aembit requires you to use Authorization Header Bearer (access) tokens when making API calls and doesn’t support long-lived credentials.”
· Scoped keysNot applicable: no static credential on the graded path.
Not applicable, but federated API tokens are scoped by the Aembit Role on the Credential Provider and optionally by Resource Set.
  • docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
    “Using the Aembit Access Token type and a Role with permissions to the appropriate entities”
· Last-used visibleNot applicable: no static credential on the graded path.
No static Aembit key exists.
  • docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
    “Aembit requires you to use Authorization Header Bearer (access) tokens when making API calls and doesn’t support long-lived credentials.”
· Leak revocationNot applicable: no static credential on the graded path.
Aembit is not on GitHub's secret-scanning pattern list (partner or user). Not applicable since Aembit issues no long-lived key; its short-lived access tokens are JWTs.

Notes

Graded the management (Cloud) API that customers automate against, including through the Aembit Terraform provider. The Edge API (/edge/v1/auth), used by the Edge SDKs and CLI to fetch target credentials, accepts the same attestation methods: AWS metadata, IAM role, Lambda and ECS, Azure metadata, GCP identity token, Kubernetes service account, GitHub, GitLab, Terraform Cloud and generic OIDC. Docs are public and complete enough to grade; no gated material was needed. Aembit also ships an MCP Identity Gateway and MCP Authorization Server; their per-user OAuth flows to SaaS MCP servers also depend on client secrets of customer-registered apps and are counted in the outbound notes.

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wif.tax grade B

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