Aembit
B Aembit Workload IAM (Aembit Cloud API and Edge)
The Aembit management API takes no long-lived keys: workloads trade an OIDC ID token from any issuer they configure, or a cloud or CI identity, for a short-lived Aembit access token. Into AWS, GCP and Azure it is keyless, but for Okta, GitHub, Slack, Google Workspace and Salesforce you still paste an API token or your own OAuth app's client secret into Aembit.
Docs: docs.aembit.io · Checked 2026-10-13 · source YAML · dispute via PR
Inbound A
How a workload running anywhere authenticates to this product.
A Trust Provider (OIDC ID Token for any issuer, plus GitHub, GitLab, Terraform Cloud, AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and Kerberos types) attests the workload and matches iss, aud, sub and custom claims; an Aembit Access Token Credential Provider bound to an Aembit Role then issues a short-lived bearer token for the Cloud API.
- Issuers
- any
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Aembit also supports authentication to the Aembit API using a native authentication capability which utilizes OIDC (Open ID Connect tokens) ID Tokens.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Aembit requires you to use Authorization Header Bearer (access) tokens when making API calls and doesn’t support long-lived credentials.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Support for Any OIDC Provider - Connect to any identity provider compliant with the OIDC standard.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Your Trust Provider can match on aud, iss, sub, or any custom claim the token carries.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“The Aembit Access Token Credential Provider generates access tokens for authenticating applications and services to the Aembit API.”
- raw.githubusercontent.com checked 2026-10-13
“Setting the environment variable `AEMBIT_OIDC_ID_TOKEN` to a system provided OIDC ID Token is required when using the generic OIDC ID Token native authentication method.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Device Codes are temporary one-time-use codes, valid for 15 minutes, that you use during installation to authenticate the Agent Controller with your Aembit Tenant.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Token Refresh - Agent Controller securely stores refresh tokens and uses them to obtain new access tokens from Aembit Cloud as needed, without requiring re-registration.”
Machine access to the management API has no static-key path at all: the only other documented method is a human's browser-session token copied from the UI profile. The Terraform provider takes only a Trust Provider "client_id" (an identifier, not a secret) plus the platform's ID token. The OIDC ID Token Trust Provider can validate signatures by OIDC discovery, uploaded JWKS, an uploaded public key, or a Base64 shared symmetric key; the last is an optional customer-held secret for legacy issuers, not an Aembit credential. Edge components: Agent Controller registers by Trust Provider attestation (AWS Role, AWS or Azure metadata, Kubernetes service account) or, on-prem and bare metal, with a 15-minute one-time Device Code; after registration it holds a refresh token it uses to mint access tokens, and Agent Proxies get their Aembit Cloud token from the Agent Controller. That stored refresh token is the one persistent credential in the Edge path and its lifetime is not documented publicly.
Outbound B
How this product reaches into your cloud, repos, or other SaaS.
Aembit acts as an OIDC issuer that your AWS (STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity), GCP (Workload Identity Federation with service account impersonation) and Azure (Entra federated credential) trust, so cloud access is keyless; most SaaS targets (Okta, GitHub, Slack, Google Workspace, Salesforce, Wiz) instead need an API token or a client secret from an OAuth app you register, stored in Aembit.
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“OIDC Issuer URL - OpenID Connect (OIDC) Issuer URL, auto-generated by Aembit, is a dedicated endpoint for OIDC authentication within AWS.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“obtain short-lived Google Cloud credentials through Aembit acting as a third-party federated Identity Provider (IdP).”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“One requesting the https://graph.microsoft.com/.default scope”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“It leverages Azure’s Workload Identity Federation, allowing Aembit to authenticate using short-lived, federated tokens based on OpenID Connect (OIDC) standards.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“API Key - Provide the key copied from Okta and use the format SSWS api-token, replacing api-token with your API token.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“A personal access token (API Key Method)”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Client Secret - Provide the Secret copied from GitHub.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Client Secret - Provide the Secret copied from Google.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Client Secret - Provide the Secret copied from Slack.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Client Secret - Provide the client secret copied from Azure.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Client Secret - Provide the Consumer Secret copied from Salesforce.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“As soon as you successfully create the integration, Aembit rotates the token for the GitLab service account and continues to rotate it as long as the Credential Provider Integration exists.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Client Secret - Paste the Client Secret you copied earlier.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“The Application Programming Interface (API) Key credential provider is designed for scenarios where authentication is accomplished using a static API Key.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Select GCS Bucket using Workload Identity Federation as the Destination Type.”
- docs.aembit.io checked 2026-10-13
“Aembit generates and securely stores a private key, while the corresponding public key is registered with Snowflake.”
Aembit's outbound surface is its Credential Providers: what Aembit Cloud (or the Agent Proxy, with Private Network Access) uses to reach the target on the workload's behalf. Checked: AWS (STS federation, keyless; Secrets Manager via an IAM Role integration), GCP (WIF, keyless; BigQuery also offers a client-secret OAuth path), Azure / Microsoft Graph (Entra WIF, keyless; the Microsoft Graph server guide and the Office 365 / Microsoft Enterprise MCP gateway pages instead use a client secret you create), Azure Key Vault (keyless via Entra federation), Vault (Aembit-signed JWT, keyless), Claude and OpenAI APIs (WIF credential providers, keyless), Snowflake (Aembit-generated key pair, only the public key leaves Aembit), S3 and GCS log streams (bucket policy and WIF, keyless). Want a static secret from you: Okta (SSWS API token, the only documented method), GitHub (PAT, or client secret of a GitHub App or OAuth app you register; no Aembit-owned GitHub App), Slack, Google Workspace / Drive and Salesforce (client secret of an app you register, plus a user authorization), Microsoft Graph via client credentials, Wiz discovery (client ID and secret), GitLab service-account integration (a PAT that Aembit then rotates). The generic API Key and Username & Password providers exist for targets with nothing better and hold whatever you paste (their docs describe no rotation), and the Azure Key Vault provider states it "Doesn’t manage secret lifecycle (creation, rotation, deletion)—only retrieval." Because the clouds are keyless and the SaaS connectors are not, this is a B; the static secrets are for third-party targets that offer no federation, which is the problem Aembit exists to contain, but the rubric counts them.
Hygiene for any static credential the product still issues
| · Expiry enforceable | Not applicable: no static credential on the graded path. Aembit issues no long-lived machine credential for its own API: access tokens carry a configured lifetime and are minted from attested identity.
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| · Rotation via API | Not applicable: no static credential on the graded path. No static Aembit key exists to rotate.
|
| · Scoped keys | Not applicable: no static credential on the graded path. Not applicable, but federated API tokens are scoped by the Aembit Role on the Credential Provider and optionally by Resource Set.
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| · Last-used visible | Not applicable: no static credential on the graded path. No static Aembit key exists.
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| · Leak revocation | Not applicable: no static credential on the graded path. Aembit is not on GitHub's secret-scanning pattern list (partner or user). Not applicable since Aembit issues no long-lived key; its short-lived access tokens are JWTs.
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Notes
Graded the management (Cloud) API that customers automate against, including through the Aembit Terraform provider. The Edge API (/edge/v1/auth), used by the Edge SDKs and CLI to fetch target credentials, accepts the same attestation methods: AWS metadata, IAM role, Lambda and ECS, Azure metadata, GCP identity token, Kubernetes service account, GitHub, GitLab, Terraform Cloud and generic OIDC. Docs are public and complete enough to grade; no gated material was needed. Aembit also ships an MCP Identity Gateway and MCP Authorization Server; their per-user OAuth flows to SaaS MCP servers also depend on client secrets of customer-registered apps and are counted in the outbound notes.
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